

## Type Qualifiers:

Lightweight Specifications to Improve Software Quality

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## Software Quality Today

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Even after large, extensive testing efforts, commercial software is shipped riddled with errors ("bugs").

-- PITAC Report to the President, February 24, 1999

Trustworthy Computing is computing that is available, reliable, and secure as electricity, water services and telephony....No Trustworthy Computing platform exists today.

-- Bill Gates, January 15, 2002  
(highest priority for Microsoft)

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## Conclusion?

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Software is buggy

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## So What?

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- Software has always been buggy
- But now...
  - More people use software
  - Computers keep getting faster
    - Speed/quality tradeoff changing
  - Cost of fixing bugs is high

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## Common Techniques for Software Quality

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- Testing
- Code auditing
- Drawbacks: Expensive, difficult, error-prone, limited assurances
- What more can we do?
  - Tools that analyze source code
  - Techniques for avoiding programming mistakes

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## Tools Need Specifications

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```
spin_lock_irqsave(&tty->read_lock, flags);  
put_tty_queue_nolock(c, tty);  
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->read_lock, flags);
```

- Goal: Add specifications to programs  
In a way that...
  - Programmers will accept
    - Lightweight
  - Scales to large programs
  - Solves many different problems

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## Type Qualifiers

- Extend standard type systems (C, Java, ML)
  - Programmers already use types
  - Programmers understand types
  - Get programmers to write down a little more...

<code>const int</code>	ANSI C
<code>ptr(tainted char)</code>	Security vulnerabilities
<code>int → ptr(open FILE)</code>	File operations

## Application: Format String Vulnerabilities

- I/O functions in C use format strings

<code>printf("Hello!");</code>	Hello!
<code>printf("Hello, %s!", name);</code>	Hello, name!

- Instead of

```
printf("%s", name);
```

Why not

```
printf(name);
```

?

## Format String Attacks

- Adversary-controlled format specifier

```
name := <data-from-network>
printf(name); /* Oops */
```

- Attacker sets name = "%s%s%s" to crash program
  - Attacker sets name = "...%n..." to write to memory
- Lots of these bugs in the wild
    - New ones weekly on bugtraq mailing list
    - Too restrictive to forbid variable format strings

## Using Tainted and Untainted

- Add qualifier annotations

```
int printf(untainted char *fmt, ...)
tainted char *getenv(const char *)
```

tainted = may be controlled by adversary

untainted = must not be controlled by adversary

## Subtyping

```
void f(tainted int);
untainted int a;
f(a);
```

OK

```
void g(untainted int);
tainted int b;
f(b);
```

Error

f accepts tainted or untainted data

untainted ≤ tainted

g accepts only untainted data

tainted ≰ untainted

untainted < tainted

## Demo of equal

<http://www.cs.umd.edu/~jfooster>

## Framework


- Pick some qualifiers
  - and relation (partial order) among qualifiers  
 $\text{untainted int} < \text{tainted int}$   
 $\text{readwrite FILE} < \text{read FILE}$
- Add a few explicit qualifiers to program
- Infer remaining qualifiers
  - and check consistency

## Type Qualifier Inference


- Two kinds of qualifiers
  - Explicit qualifiers: **tainted**, **untainted**, ...
  - Unknown qualifiers:  $\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots$
- Program yields constraints on qualifiers  
 $\text{tainted} \leq \alpha_0 \quad \alpha_0 \leq \text{untainted}$
- Solve constraints for unknown qualifiers

## Adding Qualifiers to Types

$\text{ptr}(\text{tainted char})$




$\text{int} \rightarrow \text{ptr}(\text{open FILE})$



## Constraint Generation

$\text{ptr}(\text{int}) f(x : \text{int}) = \{ \dots \}$


$y := f(z)$



$\alpha_6 \leq \alpha_1$   
 $\alpha_2 \leq \alpha_4$   
 $\alpha_3 = \alpha_5$

## Constraints as Graphs

Key idea: programs  $\rightarrow$  constraints  $\rightarrow$  graphs



## Satisfiability via Graph Reachability

Is there an inconsistent path through the graph?

