

GOTV

- Last time:
 - the politics of appointments
 - presidential role in budgeting
- Today: Get Out the Vote campaigning

Appointment politics

- singleton administrators and senate confirmation: if senators' and presidents' choices are driven *only* by policy preferences, they should always approve the president's nominee and the president always chooses a nominee at his own ideal point
 - reversionary policy implementation is some mix of *office stays vacant* and *president makes recess appointment*. If we assume that *office stays vacant* implies a spatially extreme outcome, senators will always prefer the president's ideal appointee. *Recess appointment* implies president's ideal appointee, "so resistance is futile", to quote the Borg

Appointments to panels

- majority-rule panels: odd numbers imply unique median; even numbers imply median interval
- if exiting member is not the s.q. median, the new median will be shifted in opposite direction of the exiting member. Median interval outlines the limits of how far a new prez. appointment can move policy
 - If pivotal senator and prez are on opposite sides of the new median, prez appointment is strongly constrained
 - If key senator and prez are favored by the median shift, prez is either partially constrained or unconstrained (and gets to move policy to his ideal pt)
 - if key senator and prez are hurt by the median shift, prez should be in a strategically strong position.