

Priming and Framing in the Public Agenda

- Last time: more Veto power models
- Today: priming, framing and the public agenda

Odysseus and the Sirens

- Model 2: presidential commitment
- Hypothesis that president can credibly pre-commit to vetoing a bill, even if signing makes him better off
 - reduces asymmetry, but not “subgame perfect” in single-shot games
 - in equilibrium, Congress overrides all vetoes
 - suppose president and Congress can send signals to the audience: the “Going Public” variant (president has asymmetric ability to prime/frame issues for the public, thereby affecting legislators’ induced preferences)

More veto models

- Prez commitment model: reduces asymmetry; Cong. compelled to give prez more of what he wants, even when he is structurally disadvantaged; how plausible?
- Incomplete info models: MCs have to guess what prez would accept
 - vetoes sometimes happen, and are never overridden in eq.
 - but MCs never *intend* to be vetoed
- “Blame Game”: bargaining before a moderate audience
 - assume president wishes to appear more moderate than his true preferences; MCs want him to appear extreme; actions entail *audience costs*
 - Cong & Prez know each others’ prefs, but voters don’t
 - Groseclose and McCarty model prez approval
 - prez taste for voter approval gives Congress leverage to do better than in the standard setter model when reversionary policy is bad, but “favors” the prez